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J ~~ 3. Shifty was being prosecuted for the transportation of illegal whiskey. On his 
trial the attorney f or t he Commonwealth asked the arresting officer, Vigilant, why he 
was patrolling the highway on the night in question. Over the objection of Shifty, 
Vigilant was permitted to t estify: "I had recei ved some information from ~. Dry that 
this man Shifty was hauling some illegal whiskey along this road at night." The 
officer also testified that when he sounded his siren as a signal to Shifty to stop, 
Shifty speeded up and drove at a high and dangerous rate of speed without staying 
·t on his right side of the road and that Shifty had narrowly avoided a collision with 
another car at an intersection, and a little farther down the road had run through 
a traffic light. The defendant objected to all of this testimony: 
(a) Is the testimony as to the information received by Vigilant admissible? 
(b.) Is any part of the evidence admissible with respect to Shifty's failing to stop 
and driving in a careless and reckless manner after being signalled by the offic er 
to stop? 
(EVIDENCE) (a )This testimony is not admissible. It merely amounts to Vigilant testi-
fying that Dry said that Shifty was transporting illegal whiskey and hence the 
admission of such evidence would violate the hearsay rule. It is also immaterial why 
Vigilant was patrolling the highway. 
(b) The fact that Shifty attempted to flee is admissible for it is some evidence 
of guilt, but the details of the flight are inadmissible because irrelevant as to 
whether or not Shifty was guilty of illegal transportation and highly prejudicial. 
One ought not to be convicted of illegal transportation by proof that he drove 
recklessly. See 197 Va.264 on p.452 of these notes • 
4. V~t~t7went to the plant of Manufacturing Company f or the purpose of soliciting 
an order-for an article sold by him. As he was leaving the premises, in going along 
a walkway, he fell and was hurt seriously. The Superintendent in charge of that part 
of the plant , although he did not see the accident and had no first-hand information 
about it, conducted an investigation to ascertain the facts, talked to all the 
persons who saw the occurrence and inquired from the man responsible for the upkeep 
of the walkway as to its condition and in accordance with his general instructions, 
prepared a report in triplicate of his findings. One carbon copy of the report was 
sent to Manufacturing Company ' s liability insurance carrier, the other retained in 
the Superintendent's files, and after action was brought, the original was sent to 
Manufacturing Company's lawyer. On the trial of the actiqn for damages by Visitor 
against Manufacturing Co., the Superintendent was called as an adverse witness and 
asked whether a report of the accident had been made and, an affirmative answer 
being given, he was asked to f i l e tne report. Among the t rdngs stated in the report 
was the followings "This walkway had been in bad repair for sometime and several 
other persons had fallen at this same place." 
The defendant objected to the introduction of t he report on the following grounds: 
(1) That it was a copy. 
(2) That the original was sent to the at t orney r epresenting Manufacturing Compamy 
in the case then under trial; and 
(3 ) That it was hearsay. How should the court rule on each objection? 
(EVIDEN:JE) (1) The objection that it was a copy should be overruled. Carbon copies 
are made at the same time and by the same process and are treated as duplicate 
originals. 
(2) This objection should also be over-ruled since it was made before any litiga-
tion was s tarted, and not for the purpose of being us ed in court. See(l9)of 181 Va. 
520 at p.539· 
(3) This objection should als o be overruled since the report was made as a routine 
matter in the regular course of business and hence comes under the "shop book" 
, exception to the hearsay rule. 
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6. Husband dued Don Juan at law for compensatory and punitive damages. The motion for 
judgment contained three counts. No.1 charged criminal conversation with Husband's 
wife and alleged alienation of affections as aggravation thereof; No.2 charged 
alienation of affections solely by acts and association other than criminal conversa-
tion; Count No.3 charged criminal conversation alone. The defendant filed grounds 
of defense denying all allegations of each count of the motion. On the trial, 
Husband, over the objection and exception of Do.n Juan, called Mrs. Husband as an 
adverse witness and questioned her as to her relations with Don Juan. She denied any 
improper conduct and Husband's attorney then asked her whether she had not told 
Neig?bor that she loved Don Juan, had spent week-ends alone with him at his cabin, 
and if they both could get divorces from their present spouses, they would marry. 
She denied making the statement, and Neighbor was then called and testified that she 
had told him this. Juan's counsel objected to all these questions and excepted. 
The case was submitted to the jury and the following verdict returned : "We, the 
jury, upon the issue joined find for the plaintiff under Count No.1 compensatory 
damages in the sum of $4,ooo, and compensatory damages under Count No.2 in the sum 
of $4,000 and punitive damages under Count No.3 in the sum of $9,000 a total of $17,000 against the defendant." 1 
After the jury was discharged, Don Juan filed a motion to set aside the verdict 
and grant a new trial on the following grounds: 
(1) Mrs. Husband was not a competent witness; . 
(2) It was improper to permit her to be called as an adverse witnessJ 
(3) It was improper to admit Neighbor's testimony; and, (4) The fonn of the verdictwas improper. 
How should the court rule on each of these points? 
(EVIDENCE)(l) Since this is a civil case the wife is a competent witness either for 
or against her husband except as to private communications. 
(2) Since her most priceless possession, her virtue, is being attacked by the 
plaintiff she may be called as an adverse witness. 
(3) Neighbor's testimony is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the wife 
since the alleged statements would be prior inconsistent ones to those made in court. (4) This objection comes too late. It must be made before the jury is discharged. 
Notec It is proper for the jury to separate the compensatory damages from the 
punitive. 
, ). Joe Hutc?h ~~a driver for ABC Motor Lines, and while driving southwardly on 
Highway #1 in Brunswick County at about 7:00p.m., on Sept.29,1959, his tractor-
trailer had motor trouble. A little later Molly Cracker ran into the rear end of the 
ABC vehicle while it was stopped on the traveled portion of the road and she was 
severely injured. As a result of the accident Husch was charged with not having at 
once placed the number of lighted flares on the roadway required by State law. At 
the criminal trial, Husoh testified that he did not place promptly the requir~d 
number of lighted flares on the roadway. · 
Molly brought an action in the proper Court for $25,000 against ABC Motor Lines. 
At this trial it became essential to proye whether Husoh had put out lighted flares 
immediately after having stopped on the \raveled portion of the highway~ ~nd oou~sel 
for Molly in cross-examination of Husch, asked Husch if he had not test1f1ed dur1ng 
a prior criminal proceeding arising out of the same accid~nt that he had not pronptly 
placed the flares. Huach replied, •r don't recall." Counsel for Molly then offered 
to prove by the Court reporter present at the criminal prosecution that Huseh had so 
testified. Counsel for Husoh objected to this line of questioning on the ground that 
the failure of a witness to recollect or recall his former testimony did not con-
stitute a sufficient ground for his impeachment. How should the Court rule? 
(EVIDENCE)Assuming that Husch had stated that he had put flares out promptly(th~s is 
implied from the ques tion) then he may be impeached by showing that he had prev1ously 
made prior inconsistent statement provided a proper foundation had been laid. When 
Molly's attorney asked Huach whether he had made the inconsistent statement at the 
time and place indicated he was entitled to a categorical answer. 0 I don't recallll 
is thus the equivalent of a denial. Hence the objection should be overruled. See 
188 Va .116 on p.431A of the Evidence cases in these notes. 
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2. Hardy Scales was indicted for the murder of Bill King in Surry County. The Common 
wealth, at the trial, proved that Scales killed King by inflicting a knife wound 
which caused King's death. Scales relied upon self-defense as his only defense but 
made no effort to introduce in evidence the prior bad reputation of Bill King for 
being a man of violent character. 
After the evidence in chief for the Commonwealth and for the accused had been com-
pleted, the Commonwealth attempted to offer evidence in rebuttal of the good reputa-
tion of the deceased for being a peaceful arid law-abiding citizen. 
Counsel for the accused objected to the introduction of this rebuttal evidence. 
How should the Court rule? 
(EVIDENCE) The evidence is inadmissible. Where the accused has not attacked the 
character of the deceased it is presumed good - - just how good is immaterial. 
Note: If the defendant first offers evidence that deceased was a bully, or that 
deceased had made threats, then the Commonwealth could rebut such evidence by show-
ing that deceased bore a good reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. 
See 188 Va.360, 49 s.E.2d 608 on Evidence p. 432A of these notes. 
:0 5CJ 
4. Buck Fie10was shot and mortally wounded at about 2:00a.m., in front of his hcl•e 
in Essex County. Investigating officers suspected Red Winn of the shooting. At the 
scene of the shooting was found a pistol with five unexpended bullets, each of which 
bore the same peeul.iar mark: After Red Winn was arrested, officers went to his hous.a 
and asked Winn's wife if they could look at the bullets that Red had at home. She 
showed the officers a box of cartridges, each of which had the same peculiar mark 
as the ones found at the scene of the shooting, and Officer James took one with her 
consent. 
During the course of the trial, Officer James offered the bullet in evidence. The 
Commonwealth's attorney then asked James where he had obtained the bullet and he . 
replied, "Mrs. Red Winn turned it over to me.n The attorney for the defense irnmed~-
ately objected to this evidence. Is the evidence admissible? . 
(EVIDENCE) Yes. This· evidence is admissible. The wife is not testifying in court 
against her husband nor is she violating any confidence in turning over to the 
officers what she herself observed. So held in 168 Va.668. Note: An answer based on 
statements made in 189 Va.900 which would imply a possibly different result would 
probably be entitled to considerable credit. 
b ~cl 
5. Susie Block, a pedestrian, wa~ injured when struck by Charles Amos~ automobile. 
Susie brought an action at law against Amos for $25,000 in the Circuit Court of 
Amelia County. The ,jury, after being properly instructed, brought in a verdict for 
$25,000. Immediately after the trial, the foreman of the jury came into the Clerk's 
Office, in the presence of the Trial Judge, and indicated that the jury had based 
its verdict on the theory that Amos' insurance company would pay $20,000 of the 
verdict and the defendant would have to pay only $S,OOO. 
Amos' attorney, upon learning of this conversation, moved the Court to set aside 
the verdict because of the alleged misconduct of the jury in assuming that Amos 
carried public liability insurance on his auto, and in discussing and considering 
that circumstance during its deliberations. OVer the plaintiff's object~on, the 
Court allowed the defendant to call six of the jurors, who testified that insurance 
was discussed and that the question of insurance may have entered into their con-
clusion in arriving at the $2S,OOO verdict. The defendant again~ moved the Court 
to set aside the verdict because of the alleged misconduct. 
How should the Court rule on the Motion? 
(EVIDENCE) The motion should be overruled. A jury cannot impeach its own verdict. 
Otherwise there might be no end to litigation, and verdicts would be at the mercy 
of any juryman. See 200 Va.l36 on p.459 of the Evidence cases in these notes • 
6. Early Wils~, ~fle driving his automobile east on u.S.Highway #1 in Dinwiddie 
County, Virginia, was struck by an automobile driven by Gather Jones, travelling 
west on U.S.Highway #1. The accident happened on Wilson's side of the road. Wilson 
instituted an action against Jones in the Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County for 
$5,000, his Motion for Judgment alleging $2,000 for damages to his automobile and 
$3,000 for personal injuries. 
At the trial Wilson testified that the damage to the automobile was $2 1000 and 
that his injuries were serious and painful. The jury, after being properly instruct-
ed, brought in a verdict of $2,500 for the automobile damage and $3 1 000 for 
personal injuries. 
The attorney for Jones immediately moved the Court to set aside the verdict and 
order a new trial on the ground that plaintiff could not recover more for his auto-
mobile damage thah he asked for in the Motion for judgment. 
How should the Court rule on this Motion? 
(EVIDENCE,Pleading and Practice) There are a number of equally good answers to this 
question: 
(1) No one can recover more than he asks for)because the defendant has no reason 
to prepare a defense for more than is asked. It is too late for plaintiff to amend 
after verdict. Hence the motion should be granted. 
(2) Under the rule of Massie v. Firmstone plaintiff cannot make out a better case 
than his own personal testimony shows that he has, and that is for only $2,000. 
Hence the motion should be granted. 
(3) The motion should not be granted. The jury should be instructed that their 
verdict is improper and sent back to bring in a proper verdict rather than being 
discharged. 
(4) The court should first put plaintiff on terms to remit $500 before granting 
-
ljhe motion. 
3. o"f ln~ afternoon of March 1.5, .196o, Willie Wall was driving his automobile in an 
easterly direction along State Route No.22 in Louisa County. At the same time and 
place, Buford Branch was driving his automobile in a we3terly direction. As the two 
vehicles approached e~ch other, and while Branch was attempting to pick up a package 
of cigarettes which had dropped to the floor, his automobile swerved sudenly to its 
left into the east-bound lane and immediately collided with the automobile driven by 
Wall. Shortly thereafter Wall brought an action against Branch in the Circuit Court 
of Louisa County seeking damages for the injuries sustained by him as a result of the 
collision. In his grounds of defense» Branch, although conceding his own negligence, 
pleaded contributory negligence of Wall as a defense. During the course of the trial, 
and over the objections of Hall, Branch was permitted to prove that at the time of 
the collision (a)Wall was very intoxicated and (b)Wall was driving his automobile at . 
a speed of not less than 70 miles per hour. To what extent, if any, did the Court 
err in admitting this evidence? 
(EVIDENCE--Torts) It appears from the facts that the sole proximate cause of the 
accident was Branch's act in negligently driving his car on the wrong side. Hence it 
is ~naterial whether or not Wall was intoxicated or driving at an excessive rate of 
speed. Hence evidence to such effect is inadmissible. See 146 Va. 789. 
• 
• 
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L1 . • Bert Brutus brought an action against George Griper to recover $10,000 for an 
injury sustained in an automobile collision. The motion for judgment alleged that at 
t~w time of the collision an automobile owned by Griper was being driven by Sam 
Venal, who was alleged to be an employee of Griper and operating the vehicle for the 
business purposes of the latter. In his sworn grounds of defense, Griper denied 
o·:mership of the automobile, denied that Venal was his emplotz-ee or engaged in his 
business at the time of the accident, and alleged that Venal nad stolen the vehicle 
from someone else and was driving it while leaving the scene of the theft. On the 
trial of the case, Brutus introduced evidence which clearly established negligence 
on the part of Venal. He then called to the stand Blue, the investigating police 
officer. Blue testified over Griper's objection that, at the tline of -~he collision, 
Venal had stated to him that he was driving a vehicle belonging to Griper at the 
latter's request and for the purpose of purchasing supplies to be used in Griper's 
business. After Blue had so testified, Brutus rested his case. Neither Venal nor 
Griper were ever called to the stand. Griper moved the Court to strike all evidence 
of Brutus on the ground that it failed to establish a case against him. Should the 
motion have been sustained? 
(EVIDENCE) The motion should be sustained. Blue's evidence was hearsay and inad-
missible if properly objected to. Griper has filed a proper sworn plea denying 
ownership and Brutus has failed to prove it. Venal had no power to make himself 
Griper's agent by merely telling Blue that he was such an agent. Note: The rule is 
sometimes stated to be that a person's statements that he is another's agent are 
inadmissible. But in Virginia, if there is other evidence tending to prove an agency, 
then such statements are admissible to strengthen the case of the party claiming 
that there is an agency • 
-:) (, 0 
5. Arter repeated requests made by Herman Waters, the elderly widower Alfred Ball 
orally agreed that he would sell hiv home in Alexandria to Waters on May 15,1960 for 
~~10,000, provided Ball•s son, who was then in foreign military service, gave his 
written consent to the sale. Waters then insisted that Ball reduce the agreement to 
writing. Ball honored this request by filling in the blank spaces on a printed form 
of a real estate sales contract. The contract was signed by both parties, and while 
it contained no recital of the condition of performance, Ball said when handing· it 
to Waters: "This is not to be used unless my son consents to the sale." On May 9th 
Ball telephoned Waters and correctly told him that he had received a letter from 
his son objecting to the sale and that the parties should consider the matter at an 
end. On May 12th Waters, for a valuable consideration, assigned and delivered the 
contract to Henry Colt who had no knowledge of the conversations which had taken -
place between Ball and Waters. On May 15th Colt went to the home of Ball, told hi~ 
of the assigrnnent made by Waters, and stated that he was ready to perform. He then 
learned for the first time of the understanding between the original parties to the 
contract, and was told by Ball that the latter would not perform. Colt then brought 
against Ball in the Corporation Court of the City of Alexandria a suit for specific 
performance. Ball now asks your advice on what defense, if any, he may have to the 
suit. What should you advise him? 
(EVIDENCE) I should advise him that he has a good defense. Parol evidence of the 
condition precedent is admissible not for the purpose of changing the contract, but 
to show that no contract ever existed. Since we are not dealing with money or 
negotiable instruments, Colt stands in no better position than Waters. See 148 Va.181. 
6.~~il Johnson brought an action against Caleb Groner in the Circuit Court of 
Chesterfield County to r ecover damages r esulting from injuries received by Johnson 
while driving his automobile down a highway and colliding with the rear of a truck 
then owned and operated by Groner . Groner pleaded contributory negligence as a de-
fense. During the course of the t rial, Johnson testified that he was driving down • 
the highway at 40 mi les per hour and that, when approximately 400 yards from the 
point of impact, he saw Groner pull his truck out on the highway and proceed slowly 
in the same direction and in the same lane in which Johnson was traveling. After 
this testimony was given, counsel for Johnson called to the stand two young men who 
naa oeen a~anding on the roadside at the time, and near the po~n~, or collision. Each 
of these witnesses testified that Groner darted suddenly from the side of the road 
:i.1ito the path of Johnson's oncoming vehicle which was then only 30 feet away. After 
proving his damage, Johnson rested his case. Counsel for Groner then moved that the 
pl aintiff's evidence be stricken, and that judgment be entered for the defendant. 
llow should the Court rule on this motion? 
(EVIDENCE) The motion should be granted. Under the rule of Massie v. Firmstone a 
party is not entitled to any better case than his own evidence personally given in 
court makes out. Here Johnson testified to facts which showed that he had plenty of 
time to avoid the accident. Hence he was negligent, and it is immaterial that his 
witnesses have testified differently. 
j)(j,( 
3.-rn a conference in which Injured and Negligent were attempting to compromise 
Injured's claim for damages. Negligent said to Injured, "I know I ran the red light, 
but you have no witnesses and it will be your word against mine in a trial." The 
parties were unable to settle and, when the case was tried, Negligent, while testi-
fying, denied that he had run through a red light as charged in the pleadings. 
Counsel for Injured, on cross-examination, asked Negligent if he had made the fore-
going statement at the time and place of the conference between Negligent and Injur• 
ed. Counsel for Negligent objected to the question on the ground that it was made 
during an attempt to effect a compromise and settlement between the parties. ~ 
How should the court rule on the objection? 
(EVIDENCE) The objection should be overruled. The statement is an admission and 
hence substantive evidence which is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
It is 11in the nature of an admission of an independent fact pertiment to the issue 
of the correctness of the claim. 11 Whether or not such a statement was made is one 
of creditability for the jury. See 9 S.E.2d 330 and 201 Va.862 on pp.414A and 465 
of the Evidence cases· in these notes. 
l>' l\ 4. Jobn Fabricator was on trial for perjury. The indictment charged that as a witness 
in the trial of Hot Shot for the murder of Hopeless, Fabricator swore falsely that 
he -aaw Hot Shot. ·kill .Hopel.esa; .whereas, 1n truth. Manhandl.e was the sla:var • .A.f~ 
tntroducing evidence tending to show that Hot ShGt was not present at the killir~ , 
the Attorney for the Commonwealth offered to prove that Hopeless,after he had been 
advi sed by his doctor that his wound was mortal and death was imminent, said: " I am 
dying, and I want you and everybody to know Manhandle shot me after first threatenir.g 
to kill me." Counsel for F~ricator objected to the introduction of this evidence . 
How should the court rule? (EVIDENCE) The objection should be sustained as the statement is hearsay. It does 
not come under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule since tha t ex-
ception applies only to cases in which the defendant is being prosecuted for the 
homici de of ·the one who made the statement. 4 M.J., Evi dence #208. 
• 
• 
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D&6 S~ The Busy Bee Canning Co. sued the Highroad Trucking Co. in the Circuit Court of 
Fauquier County to recover damages resulting from the collision of vehicles owned by 
the plaintiff and defendant. In the motion for judgment plaintiff averred that 
William Brakeshoe, as the employee of the defendant, drove and operated a tractor and 
trailer owned by defendant in a careless and negligent manner resulting in the loss 
sustained by plaintiff. During the trial of the action plaintiff called to the wit-
ness stand in its behalf Jonathan Snooper. Plaintiff offered to prove by Snooper 
that two days after the accident Snooper heard Brakeshoe say that just before the 
collision he was watching some hunters in a field to his right and when he looked 
back at the highway he found that his tractor and trailer had crossed the center 
line into the opposite bound lane of traffic for a distance of approximately three 
feet, and that the collision occurred while the vehicle was thus being operated. 
Brakeshoe was in the court room at the time the case was tried. Counsel for defend-
ant objected to this evidence. How should the court rule? 
(EVIDENCE) The objection should be sustained. Brakeshoe had no authority to bind 
his employer by an admission, the statement was made too late to be part of the res 
gestae, and since he is available as a witness it cannot come in as a declaration 
against intere~t. 
3-~~~aky was indicted in the Circuit Court of Isle of Wight County for burglary of 
a dwelling house in that county. At the trial, the Commonwealth proved that on the 
night of the alleged burglary the owner had returned to his home and as he opened 
his front door, a man whom he could not identify rushed past him and disappeared 
into the night. The owner .testified further that he found a leather bag in the 
house, containing burglar's tools. The leather bag and its contents were introduced 
i nto the evidence. 
The Commonwealth called as its witness Mrs. Sneru<y and offered to prove by her: 
that, although they were not divorced, at the time of the burglary she and Sneaky 
were husband and wife and that they resided in the town of Franklin; that neither 
of them ever had any reason to go near t he vicinity of the burglarized home, but 
that Sneaky had requested her sever al times pri or to the burglary to drive him to 
the home, which she had done; that on the day before the burglary she had seen 
Sneaky place in the truck of his automobile a leather bag containing burglar's tools; 
and that such bag and tools were the same as those introduced into the evidence. 
Sneaky objected to the introduction of the testimony by his former wife. 
How should the Court rule on Sneaky' objection? · . . 
(EVIDENCE ) The objection should be sustained. The Virginia view is that co~~dent~al 
communications apply to observable acts as well as to words •. ~atever th~ wl f e 
learned, she learned because of the marital rel~tion. The pr~v~lege cont~nue s de-
spi t e a later divorce. See 189 Va.900 in the Ev~dence cases of these notes • 
\ i ' ' L~ .,· In Hay, 1960, Casper Lamb agreed in writing to purchase a house and lot from 
Benevolent Land Co. for a purchase price of $10,000, pa~.ng $500 at the time of 
signing the contract, assuming an ei~ting first-inortgage loan of $8,500, and agree-
ing to pay the balance of $1,000 in twenty monthly installments. Under the contract, 
a deed was to be delivered to Lamb when he completed the installment payments. 
Shortly after entering into the~contract, Lamb obtained from a local bank a Federal 
Property Improvement loan for $1,200. This loan was not secured by lien on the 
property, but by Federal ~egulation Lamb was required to devote the proceeds to 
home improvements, and the loan was so used. 
Before Lamb had completed the monthly payments, he and Harry Wolf signed the 
following writing at the bottom of the original written contract: 
nFebruary 27,1961. For value received, Casper Lamb hereby assigns the above 
contract to Harry Wolf. 
"It is agreed that the balance owing on the Benevolent Land Co. property will 
be paid off and Mr .Lamb will not be responsible for further payments on the loan'! 
At the time these papers were signed on Feb.27,196l, Wolf paid Lamb $900 cash, for 
which he received a written receipt . When Wolf took possession of the property, he 
refused to pay the $1,200 F.P.I.loan, claiming that it was not his obligation. 
After Lamb was compelled to make the payments, he brought an action against Wolf 
to recover the $1,200. 
At the trial, Lamb introduced the foregoing writings in evidence and offered to 
testify that at the time he sold h ·.s interest in the property to Wolf, it was 
understood and agreed that v/olf wo..1ld pay off the F.P.r. loan of $1,200. Wolf ob-
jected to the admission in evider.ce of this testimony, relying on the signed papers. 
How should the Court rule on Wolf's objectio~? 
(EVIDENCE) .wolf's objection should be overruled. It is impossible to tell from the 
writing whether it means that Wolfe is to pay both the mortgage and the F.P.I. loan 
or only the former. Parol evidence is admissible to clear up this ambiguity--not for 
the purpose of changing the contract, but for the purpose of interpreting it and to 
establish the .consideration. See 190 Va.374 in the Evidence cases of these notes • 
5 ;f'Jta~t was proceeding easterly and Hest was proceeding westerly in their respective 
automobiles on Main Street in the town of Gloucester, which street is two lanes wide 
and divided in its center by double white lines. As the two cars came abreast of 
each other, a collision occurred between them, as a result of which East was in-
jured. East instituted an action for damages against West in the Circuit Court of 
Gloucester County. 
At the trial East called as a witness Overstreet, who testified that while on 
business in Gloucester he had come upon the scene of the accident several minutes 
after it occurred and that he found the debris from the collision entirely in the 
east-bound lane of the street, about three feet from the double white lines. He 
further testified that the only damage to East's car was on its left rear fender,and 
that the West car was damaged only on its left front fender. 
Overstreet further testified that he had been in the employ of the Virginia Auto-
mobile Association for 19 years, and that for the entire time Hie duty had been to 
analyze the causes of automobile accidents, and that his present position was that 
of Head Safety Engineer of the Association. His qualificaticns as an expert were 
admitted by counsel for both East and West. 
Overstreet then offered, over West's objection, to testify that in his expert 
opinion the accident had occurred as a result of West's swerving suddenly to his 
left as the automobiles came abreast of each other, that Wes t had traveled approxi-
mately three feet into the east-bow1d lane and struck the East automo.bile on its 
1 oi'+ '""' '"' '" f'o'Y'IrlCOl' C:hould the Court admit thiS t .A!'It.imonv bv Overstreet? 
(EVIDENCE) No. Opinion evidence of experts is oot admissible where it relates to 
matters that a jury is as capable of deciding as an expert. In such a case there is 
no reason for expert testimony and the conclusions of the expert are said to usurp 
the function of the jury whose business it is to pass on the facts. See 200 Va.900 
of the Evidence Cases in these notes. 
• 
• 
• 
3JP·in an action for death by wrongful act, the plaintiff sought to int:l:'oduce evidence 
of the fcJllowing matters to vrhich defendant obje~ted: 
(1) That the dAc.edont. 1tiaS married and had th-rr,e. children, aged 4, 6 ann. 8 years. 
(2) A recognized mortality table showing the dscedentrs life expectancy. 
(3) 'fha average weekly earnings of the decedent. 
(4) That the decedent was run over by defendan·~ • s automubile on Tuesday and did not 
die until ten days later, during which time he suffered excruciating pain from his 
injuries. 
(5) The amount of the funeral bills. Hmi ought the court to rule in each instance? 
(EVIDENCE) (1) Admissible. The jury must a.;:>portion the dalTlages among the members of 
the class entitled to tal~e~ This caru1ot be done unless they know who these members 
are and some o.f the more important. facts about each as to need, ability and status. 
(2)and(3) Admissible since relevant on the question of extent of injury the death 
has caused the statutory beneficiaries. 
(4) Inadmissible as thir.:J h13.s no bea~ing on the loss caused to the beneficiaries. 
Note: If they know of this suffering, and this causes the beneficiaries suffering, 
this latter fact can be shown. 
(5) Inadmissible since the statutory beneficiaries are not liable for the debts 
of deceased under the dea.t.h by wrongful act statutes in Virginia • 
. I 4J1~hopper, a customer of Wide Awake Grocery, struck her leg on a projecting shelf, 
sustaining substantial in,iiJ.rieso She sued the Grocery, alleging that it was negli-
gent in permitting the ei tuc..-.t:lon to flXist .. On the trial the G.l'OCery offered to 
prove that a.pprox:Lnat.ely 1000 customers a day regularly passed the place in question 
and that none of them had been hurt. Upon objection to the . evidence, how should the 
con::t rule? 
(r._;VII'~~ NCE) The Vi:J:"ginia view i~ that such e'Tidenco i.:; not admissible as being t.~o 
1 ' f mote~ collateral to the isoue, and <:.pt to distract the jury from the main po:Lnt 
of the case. 183 Va c495 on po425A of the Evidence Cases in thes6 noteso 
. , ,::J>~ife ~ ·..ted Husband for divorce and the custody of Junior, arse 12 years, the only 
child of the marriage. The Judge heard the evidence ~~ ten~" After the t estimony 
as to the right to a divorce had b<>:en completed, Husband of fered Junior as t , Hi.tuess 
to tt-stify as to his wishes and lihether his happiness and welfare would be prorr.oted 
by awarding h:.l.s custody to HL;.sband. 
Assuming that the C!ourt found that Junior was of normal in:.elligen~e for a child 
of his age, was he a competent witness in the case? 
(EVIDENCE) Yes. His testimony is relevant on the question of what will be for his 
best interest. He is old enough to be a.ble to observe wha t. to::>k place, to tell a:,out 
it coherently, and to appreciate his duty to t8ll the trut!-1. 195 Va.6ll o~ r:-.1220 
of the Domestic Helations cases in these notes. 
1"&_-'-
). Hatfield and McCoy entered into a written contract for the sale of 10 acres of 
McCoy's farm for $600 per acre. Hatfield has now tend~red the $6,000 purchase money 
and demanded a deed. McCoy consults you and tells you that at the same time the 
written contract was signed Hatfield agreed orally to build a road and fence along 
the prope~ty line, but that th!s had not been included in the written agreement be-
cause he trusted Hatfield to carry out his agreement. McCoy now asks you whether he 
may rel! successfully on Hatfield's promise to build ·the road and fence as a defense 
to a su~t on the written contract. How ought you to advise him? 
(EVIDENCE) MOCoy oannot tely on Hatfield's bro page 556. 
such a promise would not be admissible since ken pr?mise as a defense. Evidence of 
evidence rule. \ The stat~ment of consideratio i;s ~~ssion .would violate the parol 
but a statement ot the &greed price. p 1 n. n e.contraot is not just a recital 
terms of a valid integrated written in~um=~~~ence ~a inadmissible to change the 
4:f~~drews, a passenger in an automobile driven by Monroe, was seriously injured as 
a result of Monroe's alleged gross negligence. Andrews instituted an action in wythe 
County Circuit Court for damages against Monroe. Shortly thereafter Monroe died, 
and the action was revived in the name of his administrator. At the trial, an on-
looker testified as to Monroe's negligence. Andrews then testified as to his injuries 
and loss of income, but admitted he did not remember the facts of the accident. The 
administrator sought to introduce a written statement of the decedent Monroe of his 
version of the accident showing contributory negligence on Andrews part. Counsel for 
Andrews objected to the admission of the testimony. How should the court rule? 
(EVIDENCE) The statement is admissible as a statutory exception to the hearsay rule. 
By V#8-286 if one party is incapable of testifying, the other party cannot recover 
on his own uncorroborated testimony, and, if an adverse party testifies, "all 
entries, memoranda and declarations by the party so incapable of testifying, made 
while he was capable, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received in evidence." 
This statute applies even though the testifying party did not testify about the 
matters covered by the declarations of the incapable party. See 200 Va.)64. 
5.1~~ a suit involving the constructi on of a will, it became material to determine 
the legitimacy and age of Thomas Wilkenson who died in 1910, and the name of hie 
mother. In order to establish these matters Timothy O'neal was introduced as a 
witness and after stating his own age as eighty, offered to testify that, while he 
was no kin to the lrJ'ilkensons, he lived close to them, knew them well and as a boy 
played with Thomas. He further offered to testify:(l)that it was generally recogniz-
ed in the community that James and Anne Wilkenson were rnarried;(2)that it was also 
recognized that Thomas was their child;{J)that to his own knowledge James and Anne 
lived together as husband and wife;(4)that Thomas was two years younger than the 
witness; and (5) that he was prepared to tender the Wilkenson Family Bible in evi-
dence to show an entry therein reading& "Born Jan.3,1884 Thomas Wilkenson, third 
son of James and Anne Wilkenson.• Which, 1f any, of the above are admissible in 
evidence? 
(EVIDEOCE) All or the above are admissible in evidence under the pedigree exception 
to the hearsay rule or on the ground that 0 1 Neal has first hand knowledge of that 
concerning which he is testifying. Marriage may be shown by evidence that the 
parties lived together as husband and wife and were so regarded by the community in 
which they lived. While the declarants must be members of the family whose pedigree 
is in question, the witness need not be. WEntries in a family record or Bi ble are 
admissible as a general rule in the matter of pedigree in order to prove relation-
ship and the date and fact of the birth of a party. It is in the nature of a record, 
and, being produced from the proper custody, is itself avidence. 11 See 7 M.J., 
Evidence, #1203 to 207. 
• 
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2 !>~ing the latter part of 1961, while hauling a shipment of furniture from Rich-
mond to Fredericksburg, a truck of Richmond Transport Corporation, driven by its 
employee, Abe Duke, collided head-on with a passenger automobile then being driven 
by Robert Franks. As a result of this collision, Franks was instantly killed. There-
after, his Administrator brought an action for wrongful death against Richmond Trans-
port Corporation in the Circuit Court of Hanover County. In the meantime, Abe Duke 
had left the State and could not be found. At the trial of the action for wrongful 
death, the plaintiff called Albert Combs to prove by him that a few evenings before 
Duke's disappearance, while at a beer tavern, Duke had stated to Combs, "The death 
of Franks troubles me. I let my truck move over and hit his car on his side of the 
road. It was all my fault." Is this evidence admissible in the pending action? 
(EVIDENCE) This evidence is not admissible in this action. It is hearsay. It is not 
a part of the res gestae but narration which is not under oath. Duke is not subject 
to cross examination. Duke had no authority to make admissions that are binding on 
his employer, "and the fact that the principal is sought to be held liable because 
of the negligence or default of the very agent or servant who made the admission 
concerning it, cannot change the rule.(If the agent or servant himself is being sued, 
his admissions would bind him.)" Mechem, Outlines of Agency{3rd Ed.)#478. Note:An 
answer to the effect tpat Duke's statement is admissible as a declaration against 
pecuniary interest if he is really unavailable is plausible enough to deserve con-
siderable credit. 
).~e visiting friends in the City of Alexandria, Herbert Hugo, a wealthy Richmond 
philanthropist, went into an art shop owned and ~perated by Flavius Quid and there 
saw d}~playeq for sale an at}ract}ve landc~~e~p~!nt~ng of t~e Riv~r Seine. When Hugo/l'UiaUie~%1 ~~u~~ V~nteo~ea.Bactlffi'f., Ui\P·-pu~1I'::lsle1~tE~tw1tiSe~~;BM~Taking Quid 
at his word, Hugo bought the painting and paid the $25,000 purchase price. On his 
return to Richmond with the painting in his possession, Hugo cheerfully showed it to 
his artistic friend David Davis. Davis told Hugo that in his opinion the painting 
was r~t the work of Van Gogh, but was of inferior quality and virtually worthless. 
Hugo at once displayed the painting to an accredited expert on the authenticity of 
paintings, which expert confirmed the opinion of Davis. Shortly thereafter, Hugo 
brought an action in the Corporation Court of the City of Alexandria charging Quid 
with actual fraud. Hugo's motion for judgment, after alleging the foregoing facts, 
asked $25 1 000 as compensatory damage and $.501 000 as punitive damage. By his grounds 
of defense Quid denied liability. At the trial of the case Quid testified that,al-
though he had recently learned that the painting was not the work of Van Gogh, yet 
he had innocently misrepresented the character of the picture in the honest belief 
that it had been the work of Van Gogh. Quid further testified that he had bought the 
painting from a dealer in Paris. He then offered in evidence a receipted bill given 
him by the Paris dealer at the time of the purchase, which receipted bill referred to 
the painting as the work of Van Gogh. 
Hugo objected to the a~ssib~+!ty of tpe r~eipt~ b~ll on the ground that it was 
hearsay. Should the court have a.~t~M tlte ~p~r in endence? 
(EVIDENCE ) Yes. When the fact that a statement was made rather than the truth of the 
statement is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply. The fact that Quid was told 
t hat the ~ainting was a Van Gogh is material on the question of whether Quid intend-
ed to deceive Hugo, If there was no actual intent to deceive there is no liability 
for punitive damages. See 7 M.J. Evidence #19.5 • 
3 j'~ ces Royal obtained a judgment in the Corporation Court of the City of 
Charlottesville against Cling Peach, in the amount of $10,000 for personal injuries 
sustained by her when struck by an automobile Olvned by White Heath and operated by 
Cling Peach. As Cling Peach was worthless, Frances Royal sued Rocky Mount Automobile 
Insurance Company to recover the amount of the judgment. The public liability 
policy issued by that company to WhHe Heath provided that the word "insured" as 
used in the policy included not only the named insured, but also any person using 
the automobile with the permission of the named insured. During the trial of the 
action against the Insurance Company, Frances Royal offered to testify that, while 
she was in the hospital following the accident, Cling Pe&ch called on her and told 
her that Heath had loaned the car to him, and that he was operating the vehicle at 
the time of the accident with the permission of Heath. Counsel for the Insurance 
Company objected tb the introduction of this evidence. How should the court rule? 
(EVIDENCE) The objection should be sustained because its admission would violate 
the hearsay rule and no exception to that rule is applicable. Cling Peach should 
testify in person where he will be under oath and subject to cross examination. 
See 198 Va. 77. 
::)65 4. Buck Wheat and John Barley owned adjoining farms. As Barley had a heavy crop of 
hay he decided to purchase a second-hafud hay baler. Casting about in search of a 
baler that would suit his purposes he found that Wheat had just the right baler for 
him. Whereupon, Barley purchased the baler fnom Wheat. Shortly after Barley took 
possession of the hay baler, Timothy Hay called upon Barley to deliver the baler 
to him, claiming that he owned the equipment and that he had lent it to Wheat. 
Barley promptly advised Wheat of Hay's demand and he was assured by Wheat that he 
had given to Barley good title to the equipment. In an action by Timothy Hay to 
recover the hay baler from John Barley, Hay offered to prove by Seed Corn that he, 
Corn, had tried to purchase the hay baler from Buck Wheat before its sale to John 
Barley, and that Wheat told him that the hay baler belonged to Timothy Hay and that 
he would have to talk to him about purchasing it. Counsel for John Barley object~d 
t0 the introduction of this ev:idence. Is the evidence admissible? 
(SV IDENCE) Yes. Since there is p:!.'ivi ty of title bdwcen vJheat and Barley the ad-
m:'..ssi ons of the former against his interest with reopect to the title ma.dc !:Je-fore he 
p::1.rted with the title are treated as if made by the latter. Hence it is not. n&cess-
;;;_r::; that Wheat be unavailable. Admissions made by the adverse party(or his privies 
t•8for e they parted with the title)are admissible as an excE.ption to the hearsay 
rule. See 7 M.J. Evidence #252. 
JP ~lgan and Stacey were involved in an intersection automobile accident, both baing 
drivers of their respective automobiles. Regan sued Stacey for damages for personal 
injuries, alleging that Stacey operated his automobile in a negligent and reckless 
manner. At the trial, the following occurred: 
1. Regan offered record proof to the fact that Stacey as a result of this accident 
was charged with reckless driving and at the criminal trial of such charge, he 
entered a plea of guilty. This evidence was objected to by Stacey's counsel. 
2. Regan testified that he always tried to be careful in driving and particularly 
in regard to this intersection as he knew it ~as dangerous, that as heapproached 
it on this occasion, the light turned green in his favor and he entered the inter-
section, and that at that time, Stacey came through the red light. Knowing it to be 
a fact, Stacey's counsel asked Regan on cross-examination whether it wasn't tfue 
that he, Regan, went through the same intersection on a red light three weeks ago 
and collided with an automobile. This question was objected to by Regan's counsel. 
). Regan's counsel asked the police officer who investigated the accident three 
houre after it happened if Regan did not tell him that he, Regan, had the green 
light and Stacey ran through the red light. Stacey's counsel objected to this 
question. 
• 
• 
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4. Before Stacey had testified~ R~ga.rt offered the testimony of witness Turner to . 
the effeot that he, Turrler, had heard Stacey telling his wife and friends about the 
accident five days after the same happened and at that time he had said that he, 
Stacey, was speeding and did not notice if there was a light at the intersection an~ 
that he, Stacey, believed the accident was all his fault. This evidence was objectoc1 
to by Stacey's counsel. 
5. Stacey's counsel did not cross-examine Turner, and during presentation of de-
fendant Stacey's evidence, Stacey's counsel offered the testimony of witness Udall 
to the effect that five days prior to trial, Turner told him that he, Turner, had 
never heard Stacey say a word about the accident though he had seen him almost every 
day for a month thereafter. This evidence was objected to by Regan's counsel. 
How should the Court rule in each instance? 
(EVIDENCE)(l) Objection overruled. A plea of guilty was an admission against interes~ 
(2) Either,(a) Objection sustained. The evidence is self serving and irrelevant. 
The question is not how Regan is in the habit of driving, but how was Stacey driving 
at the time of the accident, or,(b)Objection overruled. The evidence has actually 
come in(even if it should not have been admitted) and Stacey has a right to rebut it. 
(3) Objection sustained. Evidence of prior ~onsistant statements is inadmissible 
in the absence of a claim that witness' pr~nt statement is a recent contrivance. 
Thl statement was made too late to be admissible under the res gestae exception 
to the hearsay rule. 
(4) Objectinn overruled. This evigence is admis s ible as an admission against 
interest. 
(5) Objection sustained. Stacey's counsel did not lay a proper foundation for su~;; .. 
testimony. He should have first asked Turner whether or not he had made any such 
inconsistent statements, and if he admits that he had1 what explanation, if any, 
he has for the inconsistency. / 
References: 19 Gratt(60 Va. )50; 59 S.E.2d(West Va. )437; Nash #92; 200 Va.212; 
187 Va.53; 112 Va.236. 
~ 4fbidam, a passenger in an automobile driven by Blue, was injured as the result of a 
collision between Blue's automobile and one driven by Cook, the collision occurring 
on a straight stretch of road. Adam was a good friend of Blue and sued Cook only 
and, in his motion for judgment, alleged that Blue was driving in a careful and , 
prudent manner and was not negligent but that the sole cause of the accident was-
the negligence ·Of Cook. At the trial, plaintiff Adam testified that according to 
his observation the two automobiles were approaching each other, that defendant 
Cook's automobile was not speeding and was on the proper side of the road, that he 
was not particularly observing Blue's driving, but that there was a crash as the 
two passed each other. Other witnesses on behalf of plaintiff Adam testified over 
defendant Cook's objection that defendant Cook's automobile was straddling the 
center line for a considerable distance before the collision, that defendant Cook 
was speeding and that he did not attempt to turn back to his proper side until 
imnediately before the collision, resulting in the automobiles sidesw~,.;ping each 
other. 
(1) When the plaintiff rested, Cook's attorney moved to strike plaintiff's 
evidence, whi ch motion was overruled. To this ruling Cook noted his exception. D~ 
fendant Cook then presented his evidence to the effect that he was on his proper 
side of the road and BlQe was over the center line for some distance and sideswiped 
him. At the conclusion of this evidence, defendant Cook's attorney renewed his 
motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence. This motion was again overruled, the 
Court ruling that the matter should be submitted to the jury. Cook again noted 
his exception. 
(2) The jury retired, but was hopelessly deadlocked and r eported that it could 
not agree on a verdict. Thereupon the Court declared it to be a hung jury and dis-
charged it. As soon as the last juror had left the courtroom, defendant Cook's 
attorney renewed his motion to strike plaintiff's evidence and argued the same 
, vigorously. The Court stated that it was now convinced that it should have sustained 
defendant Cook's prior motions to strike the evidence and would do so if it now had 
the authority. Defendant Cook's attorney convinced the Court that it did have 
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authority and the Court proceeded to sustain the motion and enter judgment for 
defendant Cook. Adams' attorney was outraged and objected to the Court's taking this 
action on the ground that regardless of the merits of the case, the Court had no 
authority to take such action at, thls time, but must grant a new trial in view of t~e. 
hung jury. 
(a) In regard to situation No. 1, state whether or not the Court committed error. 
(b) In regard to situation No. 2, state whether plaintiff Adam's objection is valid 
(EVIDENCE--PLEADING AND PRACTICE) (1) The Court committed error. Under the rule laid 
down in Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va.450, the plaintiff is not entitled to any better 
case than his own personal evidence makes out. Adam's testimony showed that Cook was 
using due care as a matter of law. Hence Adams has failed to prove his case, and it 
is immaterial that other witnesses for him have testified favorably to him. Hence 
the Court should have granted Cook's motion to strike. 
(2) The last half of Rule 1: ll reads, ·"If a court overrules a motion to strike the 
evidence and there is a hung jury, the moving party may renew the motion immediately 
after the discharge of the jury, and, if the court is of the opinion that it erred 
in denying the motion, it may enter judgment. in favor of the moving party. So 
plaintiff Adam's objection is not valid. 
1 Jun0 196h. 610 o 
L Duncan was on trial for the murd9r of Clark. The cv::.a.ance c.isc.lo ~~:;d that Dun~.~;:;.n 
wmt t.o Clark's room in a hotel about, 9 o•clo:;k p.-m.; that he l eft in .five minutei:l ; 
and that about 10 o'clock p .. m .. Clark t8lephonoo the ho ·t.el clei~k to call an ambu.lan,-:•:: 
to take him to a hospital. Tho hotel clerk \-J",').s t~n askedt 1\What did Clark say, if 
anythJ.ng, as to how he wa.s inj1..U"9d11 ? If perml tted to answer the question, the cle!'k 
would hav<) said: 11 I asked Mr. Clark what had happened. and he said, 'Duncan came to 
my room and hit me with a blackjack. Glilt me to the hospital qu.iekly or I may die; 
it's been an hour since I was hurt and I am bleeding.•n 
Is the evidence admissible? 
(EVIDENCE) Uo. It is hearsay. Clark's statement is not admissible as a dying de~lara­
tion be'Jat~se not made in the settled expectation of death. It is not ad.m:J.ssible as 
part of the res gestae becauso it is narrative of past events. The f .acts are not 
talking spontaneously through Clark: rather Clark is talking about the facts. 
2 Jb#on the trial of an act.ion of debt for goods sold, the plaintiff introduced h:ts 
bookkeeper as a witness solely to identify the order g:i.van by the defendant for the 
goods. The defendant, on cross-examination, asked this witnoss : »were these goods 
as warranted"? The plaj_ntiff, by counsel, objected to the quest].on on the ground 
that it was not proper oorss-e:x:amination. How ought the Court to rule? 
(EVIDENCE) The objection should be sustained. In Virginia the scope of the cross-
examination is l:imited to that of the direc t e.1ta.mination. If the defendant wants to 
examine the bookkeeper on matters no t tou~hed u_9on in the direct examination he 
should call hi m as his witno~;s and av:am.ine him dir·ectly subject to the r·ules .-Jith 
:r.Aference to direct examination. 
3. (~'f-At-Fault was a guest in an ::1utomobi le that was the process of maki~g a l.Bft 
turn off the highway uhen it was st~·u0k f:'om t h8 rear by an au to~o bile dnxen by 
Reckless. Reckless was cl.r i ·ving a..t nn unlawful rate of speed, fa1led to keep a 
proper lookout and failed to keep hj.s aut.omobile ~nde:r.. proper control. Wher: 
arrested by a State Trooper at the s~cne of, and J.Irl..'llCdJ.a+,(-;ly after, the accJ.dcn~, 
Reckless had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, and v;as mos t umtoa.dy on hJ.s 
feet . 1 . . - ta · d In an action aeainst Heckles~ for ~~25_,000 damages for person~ J.nju.r:t.es sus ~J.ne 
by Not.··At-FauH,, Reckless ~chni tted that h~ ~~s legally respon~1.ble for the acc 1.~ent 
and for the :l.n,1uries sutJtaJ.ned by the pla1.r1~1.ff. Reckless ObJected when Not-~~) . 
:;·au.l ·t. sought to have the Stal:.c Trooper testi fy con~crning evidence of his intcxi-
r;:l i·,ion. How should the trial court rule on the admissibility of this evidence? 
(LV IDENCE ) This evidence is n t admis sible. Plaintiff ' s compensatory damD.ges ~r e t he 
8 <..11il0 w!L ther def endant was drunk or sober. Such &vidence would only t end to 1.nflar.:B 
t he jury and hence would be prejudiciaL This answer assumes that the admissi~m 
w..;.s m2 de in such a way as to be part of the record, and that punitive damages are 
not re~overable aca·nst a defendant who had no malice juot bec~ll se he has had too 
much to drink. See 203 Va.92J on p.h70 of ,the Evidenc e CaseJ 1n these Notes . 
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4f Speedy was tried in the Circuit Court of Hashington County on a charge of operat .. 
ing an automobile in a 45-mile per hour zone at 60 miles per hour as determined by 
rada.r. In laying the foundation for testimony based upon ra.dar readings, State 
Trooper X testified for the Commonwealth that he was familiar with the operation 
of radar; that he, vlhile working with 'l'rooper Y, set up at the location in question 
a radar machina used by the Virginia State Police; that the State Police fellowed 
a regular procedure to test the accuracy of radar machine both before and after 
they had been put. in operation at a particular point; that the procedure used was 
to set up the equipment and allow a short. time for it to '1 wa:..~m up", after which one 
officer drove his automobile through the zone of opera"t,ion at speeds of 10, 6o 
and 50 miles per hour while the second officer read the radar meter on the ground .. 
Trooper Y was in the hospital on the day of the trial. After X had testified as 
indicated above, the Commonwealth offered to prove by him that the standard proced-
ure was followed ]mmediately prior to Speedy's arrest; that after the radar machine 
had been set up and allowed t.o nwarm up", he drove his a.uto;nobile through the 
operation zone at speeds of 70, 60 and 50 miles per hour while Trooper Y observed 
those speeds on the radar met~r; e>.nd that Trooper Y then drove his automobile 
throu.gh the zone at ::·peeds of 70, 60 and 50 miles per hou.r, vrhile he .• Trooper X, 
read the radal' meter. Speedy objected to this evidenee. Was it admissible'6 
(1!..\TIDENCE) No. Such evidence is a. deduct.ion from hearsay, Neither officer knows 
first hand what the other's radar or speedometer reading is. Both must be present 
and thus subject to cross-ea~nation. See 204 Va.266 on ~ .471 of the Evidence 
Cases in t~ese Notes. 
5.:1"<fn~;arch 14, 1965, while in Norfolk on a business trip, Horace Black rented a 
passenger automobile from the Dandy-U-Drive-It Company. On the afternoon of that 
day, while Black was driving along Granby St$, the car suddenly swerved to the left, 
causing Black to fall across the seat and severely lacerate his scalp against the 
side of the vehicle. The automobile was not itself damaged. Shortly thereafter 
Black told Dandy-U-Driv-It Company that he thought the Company responsible for his 
injuries, and stated that he was willing to settle his claim. The Company deni6d 
any liability saying that it believed the injury to Black had resulted entirely from 
his improper handling of the automobile. Black then brought an action against 
Dandy-U-Driv-It Company to recover damages of $2500, and e.lleged that the accident 
had occurred solely because of the negligence of the Company in permitting a defect-
ive steering apparatus to be present in the automobile rented him. In its grounds of 
defense, the Company denied this allegation. 
On the trial of the case, Black testified concerning his rental of the automobile, 
and all facts leading up to the collision and his injuries. Black then called to 
the stand Arthur Wood who, by questioning, was identified as having been a mechanic 
employed in that capacity by Dandy-U-Driv-It Company on Mareh 15, 1965. Black's 
counsel then asked Wood, 11Did you, on March lfi, 1965, remove the steering apparatus 
of the automobile in which Mr. Black was injured and replace it with a new one"? 
Counsel for Dandy-U-Driv-It Company objected to this question on the ground that it 
was neither relevant nor material. How should the court rule on the objection? 
(EVIDENCE) The objection should be sustained. The fact that defective steering 
apparatus was removed does not show that defendant was negligent. in not discovering 
such defects before the accidentp In fact the accident could have resulted from a 
break in the mechanism a second or so before the accident. Besides no rule of law 
ought to discourage the prompt making of repairs. And hindsight frequently shows 
1 negligenc4'which foresight could not for~ea. See 137 Va.726 • 
·--{., '::>---
3.) John vJhite, a resident of the City of Pj_chmondj owned a house in that city. Fred 
Baker, who was being transferred to Richmond by his employer, Superior Manufacturing 
Company, was interested in buying che house from vn1itea During their negotiations, 
Baker told \r.lhite he would buy the house on the condition that White would paint it 
within 30 days after the contract to sell was executed by the parties. To this, 
White_ stated his agreement, although it was his secret~ intent not to paint the 
house. On the following day, April 2, 1965, ~fuite and Baker executed a written con-
tract to sell and purchase which had been prepared by ~~Thi te' s lawyer, and which 
contract made no reference to the oral agreement between Baker and 1Nhi te concerning 
the painting of the house. The writt en contract contained the following statement: 
"This contract const~_tutes the entire understanding between the parties." 
On Nay 4, 1965, Balcer returned to Richmond and found that "White had not painted 
the house. He then telephoned TrJhi te and asked why the latter had not done as h3 
-.. ._.. -~ ... u J.:LJlt..-J.IJ. ...... , ....,../ • - ,.,-- • 
hc:.d promised. White repliled, nr have neve:r- intended to paint that house, and you 
:rms t take it as it is. 11 Shortly thereafter Baker brought a suit against White in 
tr,e Chancery Court of hll.e City of Richmond in which he alleged fraud by 'lr<Thite and 
p:tayed that the court decree recission of the contract. On the trial of the case, 
~-l'ti 1)h \vas heard ore tenus, Baker sought to testify concerning the oral understanding 
-,..rith Hhite. To suchtestimony, "White objected on the ground that the written contract 
~vas controlling and could not be alter.ed by parol evidence. How should the court 
rule on White's objection? 
(EVIDENCE) 1-lhi te' s objections should be over-ruled. The object of the parol evidence 
is t o show that the whole contract is voidable because of fraud in its inducement, 
rather than ~o show a different contract from the one made. Such evidence is ad-
missible in a court of equity to show grounds for rescission of the contract. See 
109 Va. 776 and 164 Va.412. 
~ s . 
4. Howard Kay brought action against John True in the Circuit Court of Halifax County 
to recover damages for a trespass. In his motion for judgment, Kay alleged that on 
the night of April 10, 1965, Tru~, while in a drunken condition, had driven a bull- • 
dozer through the garden adjoin.ing Kay's home and had thereby destroyed his fenc8 and 
valuable shrubbery. In his grounds of defense True denied all responsibility. On 
the trial of the case, Kay called to the stand Herbert Hart who testified that on th3 
evening in question he had seen True drive a bulldozer in the manner, and with the 
result, alleged by Kay. On cross-examination counsel for True asked Hart, "Do you 
know Sam Cook"? To this Hart replied, !'I certainly do. tve work at the same plant 
a:1d I saw him there this morning." True's counsel then asked, "Did not Cook state 
to you on the morning after this trespass that it was he, and not True, who had 
driven the bulldozer through Kay's garden"? To this question, counsel for Kay ob-
jected and asked that the jury be instructed to disregard it. Counsel for True 
replied that any such statement by Cook would be against his interest, and that Hart 
should be permitted to answer the question. How should the court rule on Kay's 
objection? 
(EVIDENCE) Kay's obj€Ction should be sustained. A declaration against interest(made 
by a third party as distinguished from an admission made by one of the parties or 
their privies) is not admissible if the declarant is available. See 178 Va.325. 
• 
• 
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DIP > 2.By the terms of a written contra~t Pine sold all of his standing timber on his 
farm, "Oak Hill n, to Ridgewood Lt'.mber Company. Fhe contract provided that the 
purchaser should remove and pc..y f or all of the t i.nbe:c within a period of two years 
from the date of the contract ., Ti1e Lumber Company cut and r E:moved one .. fourth of th;~ 
timber wH,hin six months from the nate of t he co ntra~t but stopped cutting thereaft, :: 
claiming that Pine interfered with the Company's 0perati ons on the property to an 
extent that made it extremely difficult to carry out the cutting operations. There 
followed an exchange of correspondence between Pine and the Lumber Co. by which each 
party stated their respective positions and sought resolve of their differences. 
Pine denied, in his letters to the Lumber Co., that he had in any way interfered 
with the timber operations on his land, and insisted that the timber be removed and 
paid for pursuant to the terms of the contract. On the other hand the Limber Co., 
in its letters, insisted that Pine had interfered with the Company's performance 
of the contract. The IJumber Co. did not resume cutting the timber, and at the end 
of the two-year peri od called for by the contract, Pine sued the Lumber Co. to re-
cover the contract price. 
In the trial of the action the Lumber Company offered in evidence a letter it had 
written to Pine stating the particulars in which Pine had interfered with its cutti ~. 
operations, and, simultaneously, it also offered in evidence the letter sent by 
Pine in reply. Counsel for Pine obje~ted to the admission in evidonce of the letter 
written by the Lumber Co. on the ground that it constituted a / self-serving declara-
tion. How should the court rule on the objections? 
(EVIDENCE) The objection should be overruled. Headnote 4 to 202 Va.877 states the 
law as follows, "A letter from(one attorney to the other) that his client was will-
ing to resume operations under the contract on written assur ance of no further 
interferance was properly admitted in evidence. It was par t of the genera] corres-
JX:ndence between th~ Il~e relev~nLt.Q_ the issues,_ henQ_e_ not obj.ection-
able as a' l serv1n declaratl o " It was relevant as to the attitude of the 
r par ies with respect to the interpretation and continuation of the contract. 
' 3 .. ~~6hn Peacemaker was indicted and tri ed in Dinwiddie County, Va., for the murder 
of Horace Strife . The evidence showed that duri ng the strike of the employees of a 
manufacturing plant situat e in that County, Peacemaker ki lled Strife who was one of 
the strikers. The prosecution introduced evidence to show that Peacemaker harbored 
a hatred for Strife, and that pursuant to a malici ous intent he sought out and 
killed Strife. Peacemaker called in his behalf Billy Harp, who of fered to testify, 
over the objection of the prosecution, 
"On the evening before the killing I met John Peacemaker on the street 
and I said, 'Horace Strife hasn't beat you up yet, has he?' and he said 
'No, but don't you know I'm afrai d of that man, Strife, and I have been 
tryi ng to keep away from him.'n Was this evidence admissible? 
(!WIJJI!:NCE) Yes, this evidence i s admi ssible . I t is rel evant on t he issue of Pea": ~:.;1 
mc.ker q s maJ_icious intent, a.nd whether PE-acemaker deliber a'cely pl anned t o carry out a 
scheme t o kill S·C.rifo . Peacemaker is unavailable as a wi tness s i nce he is pr i v·ileg·o 
not t o t estify . 
/ 
h . .P ~y Farmer sued City Slicker to recover damages for the loss of three pri~1e e·t.eers 
owned by Farmer. In his motion for judgment Farmer charged that s:~iclcer had ct~t 
Farmer's wire fence, leaving his land open, with the result that the three fJt ee:;,-·s 
got out on the highway and were struck and killed. City Slicker denied liability" 
At the trial the only evidence available to Farmer to prove his case \lras hia ovm 
testimony which he offered as follows: ~ 
"I do not know City Slicker and except for a telephone conversation which 
I shall relate I have never heard him speak. I cnlled number 777-1111, which 
was listed in the telephone directory as the residence of Ci.ty Slicker. A 
man answered the ~phone and stated that he was City Slicker. I told him I 
heard that he had been hunting on my property on Novermber 20,1965, and I 
asked him whether he had cut the fence and left it open. He stated that as 
all the gates on my property were padlocked that he did cut the fence and 
left it open for he had no way of closing it. He further stated that if I 
was going to keep my gates locked and post my property, he would cut the 
fence again if necessary irl order to hunt on my land. •• 
Counsel for City Slicker objected to this t esti mony on the ground that it did r·.o ~ 
sufficiently identify City Slicker as the one responsible. How shoJ.ld the cou.:t·t 
have ruled? 
(EVffiENCE) The court should rule that the telephone communicaUon is admissible. 
When one calls a listed number and the party answering identifies himself as the 
part.y called, and the conversation is about a matter that would normally be brc'-' f)- ::, 
up under the circumstances there is sufficient identificati on of the party ca .... c t, 
and if what he said would have been admissible if the p.:1rties were talking fa(~L ··,o 
face, will be equally admissible if satd over the telephone . 
680. 1 June Exam. 1966. 
1. Axelrod sued Bluestone in the City of ~ynchburg on a cause of action to r~eover 
for personal injuries because of a fall Qtcurring on May 1 1965 allegedly due to Bluest~ne's negl~gent maintenance of his business establi~hment in Lynehburg. At 
the tnal on Apr1l 15, 1966, there was a conflict of t he evid~nce as to how the accident.happen~d and whether Axelrod had actually been on the premises on the day 
in quest1on. In the cross-examination of Axelrod, Bluestone's lawyer asked Axelrod 
if it wasn't true that Axelrod has been: 
(a) Convicted of petit larceny in Virginia on June 10 1955· 
(b) Indict~ f~r malici ous wounding and maiming i n Vi;gini~ on February 5, 1960, 
and at his . tr1al on March 11, 1960, eonvicted of simple assault; 
(c) Cnnv1cted or drunkenness and illegal possession of intoxicants in Virginia 
on April 6, 1965; 
(d) Convicted or grand larceny in Virginia on February 2 1966· and 
(e) Convieted of rape in North Carolina on May 10, 1950.' ' 
Axelrod's lawyer objected separately to each questi on, stating grounds therefor. 
How should the Court rule on each objection? 
(EVIDENCE)(a) Admi ssible as involving moral turpitude although only misdemeanor. 
(b) ~nadmissible as to indictment for malicious wounding and maiming as no eonviet-
ion;lnadmissible as to simple assault since not involving moral turpitude. (c) In-
admissible not involving moral turpitude.(d) Admissible since conviction of felony. 
Felony eonvietions almost ~invariably involve moral turpitude and no qu4stion as to 
this one for gr and larceny. (e) Admi s s ible irre~pective of whether rape was eom- · · 
mitted in Virginia or elsewhere, as i nvolving mor al turpitude. McLane, 20i Va . 
197; 201 Va. 799(petit larceny a~ i nvolving moral turpitude); Parr (good discussion 
by court of admiss ibili ty where convi cti on of eri me involvi ng moral turpitude and 
non admissibility otherwise .) 198 Va.721; Code #19-239. 
• 
• 
• 
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2~~arr wac injured on the premises of Donnelly Apartment Corporation in Virginia 
Beaeh, Vir ginia, where he was struck by a handcart being pushed by one Edwards. 
Carr instituted an action in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach 
against Donnelly Apartment Corporation alleging that the defendant was negligent 
in u~ing or permitting the use of a defective cart, and that Edwards, as an 
employee and servant of Donnelly Apartment Cerporation, was negligent in puehing 
th~ cart into th~ plaintiff. Donnelly Apartment Corporation by proper responsive 
Pleadings denied all allegations of negligence, and expressly denied that Edwards 
was its servant acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the 
alleged injury. 
At the trial, plaintiff put on his first witness, Fo~dick, a privnte ·in~r, 
and established that Edwards' present whereabouts was unknown and that Fosdick bad 
i nvestigated the accident for Carr. Upon being asked the result• of the investiga--
tion, Fosdick testified: 
"On the evening of the same day of the accident, I located Edwards at 
hia home, and he told me that at the time of the accident:(a) he wa~ 
going home after having quit work for the day for Donnelly, having 
punched out on the time clock a half hour earlier, but the manager 
of the apartment house asked hj_m to take the cart outside, and (b) 
that he, Edwards, knew that the cart had bad wheels and 1-1as hard to· 
eontrol and had repor~d this to the manager some time previously, 
but .it had not been fixed and on this occ~s ion, he was in a hurry and 
did not -even see Carr before he s truck him ." 
Def-eme eounsel objected to this testimony on the grounds: (a) that Edwards' tJtate-· 
ment as to working for the defendant at the time of the accident was inadmissible, 
and (b) that Ed.wardo• statement as to the defective cart and his negligent operation .. 
thereof, in any event, was inadmissible against and not binding on the corporate 
defendant.. How should the Court rule on each objection? 
(EVIDENJE & AGENCY) (a} Declarations of an agent cannot be rt!eeivad to prove the 
ageney until the fact of his agency has been otherwise established. When from 
extrinsic sourees a prima facie ease of agency i s made out, the agent•~ own -declara· 
tions and admissions become admissible. Turner, 201 Va.693. Griffith, 176 Va. 378. 
Inadmissible where not made as part of res gestae. Transit, 200 Va._ 044 .• . 
(b) Statements of agent concerning accident not admissible as admission against 
interest whe:·.J agent not a party to t he action. Master not bound by admissions of 
servant made t c~.-~·rmd the immediate sphere of t he agency and not during the trans-
action of the b~8iness in whi ch they are employed. Turner, 205 Va. 691. 
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717. Section 1. June 1967. 
1. Joe Hardluck was seriousl;1injured and his car demolished while he was driving 
to work at the Newport News Toy Boat Factory. The accident, which occurred at an 
intersection, was quite unusual in that Harduck's automobile was hit on both sides 
at virtually the same instant by two different vehicles which were approaching in 
opposite jirections from a oross street. One or the cars was driven by Freddie 
Fastback, a 2.3-year old youth notoria.us for his disregard of the traffic laws. The 
other one was driven by Cataract McGoo, an aged veteran of the Spanish-American War. 
Both Fastback and McGoo were charged with reckless driVing as a result of the 
accidents. At the traffic hearing the infirm but honest McGoo pleaded guilty to the 
traffic charge and paid a fine. Fastback, fearing the revocation of his driving 
privileges, pleaded not guilty and vigorously defended the charge. He was, however, 
convicted of reckless driving. 
In a civil action brought by Hardluck against Fastback and McGoo, Hardluck, in an 
appropriate manner, sought to show as evidence of negligence Fastback's conviction 
of reckless driving and MoGoo's plea of guilty to that charge. 
(a) Is evidence of Fastback's conviction of reckless driving admissible? 
(b) Is evidence of McGoo's plea of guilty admissible? 
(EVIDENCE) (a) Evidence of conviction i s not admissible. Judgment of conviction or 
acquittal in a criminal prosecution does not establi sh in a subsequent civil action 
the truth of the facts on which it was rendered. The reason for the rule is thai; 
the parties in a criminal proceeding are not the same as those in a civil proc~~d~ 
ing and there is a consequent lack of mutuality.(201 Va.466). 
(b) Evidence of plea of guilty is admissible as an admission agai nst interest. 
However, it must be direct and express as it is here rather than implied by throw-
i ng oneself at merey of court and agreeing to pay small fine to make peace on best 
terms possible without confessi ng or denying gui lt.(l9 Gratt.(60Va.)50). ~ 
• 
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2.J#laintiff, Administ~ator of the Estate of Roy Smith, instituted a death-by-
wrongful-act action against Al Prufrock in the Circuit Court of Rockingham County_, 
Virginia. The evidence showed that Prufrock drove his truck uith a load of logs t:> 
Smith's lumber yard. Shortly after receiving instructions from Smith as to where 
to unload the logs, Prufrock released the log chain preparatory to unloading the 
logs, and immediately one of them rolled off the truck. Smith, who had walked 
away from a position in front of the truck toward an office building to its left, 
had returned without P~uf~ock's knowledge to a position on the left side of the 
truck and was crushed to death by the log which rolled off. 
In an effort to show that Prufrock was negligent, Plaintiff called him as an 
adverse witness. Prufrook testified to the above facts and that Smith had directed 
him to undo the chain and unload the logs. This evidence, which was neither contra-
dicted nor corroborated, was all the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff in the 
case as to the occurrence of the accident. 
When the Plaintiff rested his case, Prufrock moved the court to strike Plaintiff's 
evidence on the ground that Prufrock's tes~~ony, which was binding on the 
Plaintiff, showed that Prufrook ·.was guilty of no actionable negligence. Prufrock•s 
motion .~as opposed by Plaintiff on the ground that Prufrock's testimony was not 
corroborated by other evidence. 
How should the court rule on Plaintiff's objection to the motion? 
(EVIDENCE) The court should overrule Plaintiff's objection to the motion. Deadman 
statute #8-286 is inapplicable. That section provides that, in the situations it 
deseribes, no judgment or decree shall be rendered in favo~ of an adverse or in-
terested party founded on his uncorroborated testimony. Here, Pruffrock's testimony 
was offered by the Plaintiff himself in his effort to obtain a judgment against 
Prufrock. It was not contradicted and Plaintiff is bound by it. 
735. Section 1, December 1967. 
1. At 11:30 p.m. during the night ~f October 10, 1967, Earl Snyder was driving 
his autom~?ile at a proper speed al~ng C~ry Street in the City of Richmond. Jast 
after pass1ng the street's interseetion with Ninth Street, Snyder became blinded 
b~ the bright lights of an ~ncoming vehicle which he believed to be swerving toward 
him. Snyde: pulled t? his right to a void a collision and, when he did so, the right 
front of h1s automob1le crashed into a pile of unlighted concrete slabs which had 
been placed in the street and along ·the curb by the City of Richmond. This collision 
caused Snyder to sust~in severe_personal injuries. Af~er giving proper notice,Snyder 
brought an action aga1nst the C1ty of Richmond, alleg1ng the foregoing facts, alleg-
ing that he had no pr~or knowledge that the slabs were in the street and charging 
the City with negligence and seeking damages of $8,000. In its grounds of defense 
the City denied that it had been negligent and averred that Snyder's injuries had 
been caused by his own negligence. On the trial of the case Snyder proved the facts 
alleged in his motion for judgment and rested. The City then offered evidence that 
on the night of October lOth traffic in both directions along Cary Street was heavy 
at the place of the collision, and that within thirty minutes prior to the accident 
not less than fifteen other motor vehicles travelling in the same direction as was 
Snyder had passed the pile of concrete slabs without accident. Counsel for Snyder 
objected to the admission of such evidence. Was this evidence admissible? 
(EVIDENCE) Suoh evidence as offered here by the City is clearly inadmissible. Con-
ditions thirty minutes before plaintiff had his accident may not have been the same. 
Other drivers may not have been blinded by headlights on other cars, or may have 
been exercising more than ordinary care for their safety. Sueh evidence is simply 
immaterial on the issue of whether plaintiff was exercising due care. See 165 va.24. 
2~~aicab owned by Green Cab Co. and operated by its employee John Roberts was 
driven over a curbing in the City of Danville and collided with the front of a 
furniture store owned by Tom Sands. On the afternoon of the accident Roberts, as 
required by Company rules, delivered to his employer a written statement reciting 
his version of the facts. At that time no litigation was threatened. However, Sands 
thereafter brought an action Against Green Cab Co. in the Corporation Court of 
Danville seeking damages of $5,000 allegedly sustained by the destruction of his 
store window and ~urniture because of the collision. The Company referred the de-
fense of the case to Andy Lawman, its regularly retained counsel, and at the latter~ c 
request delivered to him. the written statement of the accident prepared earlier by 
Roberts. During the trial of the case while Roberts was on the stand, and for the 
purpose of contradicting him, counsel for Sands moved the Court that it require 
Lawman to produce the statement of Roberts, which statement Lawman had among his 
trial papers. Lawman objected to the production of the statement contending that 
the paper was confidential and privileged(a)because it was written by Roberts as 
required by his employee relationship with the Company, and (b) because the paper 
was held by Lawman in his capacity as attorney for the Oompany in defense of the 
case. How should the Court rule on each ground of Lawman's objection? 
(EVIDENCE) The evidence is admissible despite both of defendants objections. A 
report of an accident made immediately thereafter and before any action is brought, 
by an employee within his line of duty is admissible against the employer in an 
action to recover damages for injuries caused by the accident. Furthermore, sending 
such report to an attorney either before or after an action has been instituted 
will not make it privileged. See 106 Va. 681, 181 Va.520. 
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